Battle of Tassafaronga

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The Americans Reorganize

After the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, Halsey received his fourth star as a full admiral after the U.S. Senate confirmed his presidential nomination on November 26. The Americans were now stronger while the Japanese weakened. He brought in several staff officers from his prior commands to handle the growth in the command. Planning began on increasing the American ground forces. As of the end of November 1942, the Americans did not have enough ground troops on Guadalcanal to take the offensive against the Japanese.

Halsey needed to reorganize his naval command with the deaths of Admirals Scott and Callaghan. The restored carrier Saratoga returned from Pearl Harbor to join the damaged Enterprise. Nimitz sent two cruisers, three escort carriers to Halsey’s command. With her torpedo damage repaired, the battleship North Carolina joined the Washington. The battleship Indiana would follow soon. After sustaining heavy damage on November 15 at the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal, the South Dakota headed for Pearl Harbor for repairs. Admiral Lee now had three battleships under his command.

Exercising caution and protecting his important carrier resources, Halsey ordered the Enterprise south out of range of any marauding Japanese aircraft and ships. On November 14, Kinkaid took the carrier force to Nouméa. After arriving at that safe haven, Kinkaid received orders from Halsey to relinquish command of the Enterprise’s task force and take command of all cruisers and called it Task Force 67. Kinkaid issued operational orders to all the ships under his new command what to do if they went into battle again against the Imperial Japanese Navy. He never go the chance to implement these when Admiral King ordered him to Pearl Harbor for reassignment.

Radm. Carlton Wright took command of Task Force 67. He looked at Kinkaid’s orders and saw no reason to change them.

Halsey and his staff began planning for the massive relief of the men on Guadalcanal. But the Japanese had ideas of their own.

Planning More Runs of Tokyo Express

After sending all the men and materiel they could, the Japanese had more than 10,000 men on Guadalcanal. Every attempt to help them met with tremendous losses in ships, aircraft, and men. The Japanese soldiers’ situation was now at the most desperate level. While the November landings brought more men, many of the supplies never reached them as they languished behind their lines — the Japanese still had not solved their logistics bottleneck between the arrival points and the men who needed them the most.

Repeatedly urgent appeals for food, medicine, and ammunition went to Rabaul and Truk. Reduced to literally living off the land by eating wildlife and vegetation to stay alive, the Japanese soldiers slowly starved to death. An officer in a Japanese regiment told his unit’s commander how serious his men’s condition was:

“Rice. I really want rice. I want to give my men as much as they want. That is the only wish I have. Even when mortars are falling like a squall or the land is reshaped by bombs I don’t worry. But I can’t stand looking at my men become pale and thin.”

Now was the time for the Japanese leaders to act. They tried sending submarines to land more supplies. American PT boats and planes intercepted them on the evening of November 24 and forced the submarines to cancel their mission and retreat. They had more success when the put about 11 toms of supplies into motor boats that took their cargoes ashore. They continued to put supplies ashore for a total of 20 to 30 tons — enough for one day’s rations for 17^th Army.

The Japanese decided to use their precious destroyers and put floatable drums aboard the ships. When the ships arrived offshore, their crews would tie the drums together with ropes and push them overboard. Boats from the shore towed the drums ashore where soldiers would enter the water and manhandle the containers ashore.

The Combined Fleet staff planned five supply runs down the Slot. Admiral Tanaka formed a force of destroyers to make the first trip. He completed his preparations on November 29 and led his eight destroyers from Shortland harbor that night. He set his course similar to Mikawa’s route before the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal to avoid detection.

However, coastwatcher Paul Mason sighted Tanaka’s ships leaving Shortland and reported that fact to Halsey’s headquarters. An American search aircraft flew over Tanaka’s ships but never saw them. A decoded Japanese message from Yamamoto might have disclosed Tanaka’s plans; but that never reached Halsey. Mason’s report was the only confirmed sighting of Tanaka’s destroyers. That was all the Americans needed to move into action.

Tanaka and Wright's Routes

The Americans’ Countermove

On the evening of November 29, Halsey ordered Wright to take Task Force 67 into the waters off Guadalcanal’s north shore and intercept Japanese ships making another run of the Tokyo Express. He gave every cruiser and destroyer he could spare to Wright. It was a mighty fleet that clearly outgunned the Japanese destroyers heading their way.

Relative American and Japanese Firepower

	Guns			Torpedoes
	8-inch	6-inch	5-inch	21-inch	24-inch
Americans	37	15	68	67	—
Japanese	—	—	46	—	64

The Americans had an unmistakably numerical advantage over the Japanese in guns and torpedoes. However, this table belies the quality of each side’s weapons and the training the men of each side received using them.

The Japanese had developed a torpedo in the interwar years that had already proved its superiority in the Naval Battle of Guadalcanal. Called the “Long Lance” torpedo, it had greater range, speed, accuracy, and firepower than any torpedo the Americans had. At the Battle of Tassafaronga, the Japanese demonstrated that superiority again and inflicted a devastating tactical defeat on the Americans and cost many American sailors’ lives. Nonetheless, the Japanese failed to land enough supplies to help the beleaguered 17^th Army.

Facing Reality

Instead of getting better, the plight of the Japanese soldiers on Guadalcanal had worsened. The time had come for the Japanese to face reality and make some critically important strategic decisions. With the bitter inter-service rivalry between the Japanese Army and Navy, making these judgments would be difficult indeed. For the Japanese soldiers on Guadalcanal, the sooner, the better.