Battle of Savo Island

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A First Run of the Tokyo Express

The Japanese radio at their Tulagi seaplane base transmitted a message that said the American invasion had begun and American troops were landing on the beaches. This message alerted the air forces on Rabaul. Not much time passed when Japanese bombers took off and headed down the Slot toward Guadalcanal.

Soon they appeared over Turner’s fleet. However, the coastwatchers alerted the Americans that Japanese bombers were on their way. The Americans already had fighters flying CAP and then launched every fighter they could spare. When the Japanese bombers arrived, the Americans sprung their trap and a slaughter of the Japanese bombers ensued. One American transport took heavy damage and left a smoking wreck when the Japanese survivors turned around and retreated to Rabaul.

The Imperial Japanese Navy Plans an Attack

Vice Admiral Gunichi Mikawa began planning his attack on the American shipping now disgorging troops and materiel on Guadalcanal. He wanted to send their heavy cruisers — the pride of the Japanese Navy — down the Slot, surprise the Americans, and destroy enough transports to force the Americans to withdraw their troops and leave. If the Americans offered any resistance, he had the confidence in his ship captains’ experience in fighting surface battles at night despite the lack of radar.

Realizing it could never build enough capital ships in the years between the two world wars, the Japanese Navy perfected their optical sighting systems and trained their men to refine their ability to spot and target their foe’s ships at night. They also had another deadly weapon – a technically superior torpedo called the “Long Lance” that carried a large warhead and had a greater range compared to anything the Americans had. They also trained extensively their cruiser and destroyer crews to use these weapons in devastatingly destructive nighttime torpedo attack tactics.

Mikawa boarded his flagship, the heavy cruiser Chokai, from his headquarters at Kavieng on New Ireland, accompanied by the light cruisers Tenryu and Yubari and the destroyer Yunagi, and headed toward Rabaul on August 7. An American B-17 bomber sighted Mikawa’s ships at 12:31 p.m. that day and radioed a sighting report to MacArthur’s headquarters in Brisbane, Australia. His ships joined the heavy cruisers Aoba, Kinugasa, Kako, and Furutaka that were at Rabaul and headed south in the passage between New Britain and New Ireland Islands. Although not large, Mikawa’s force was a powerful one with five heavy cruisers, two light cruisers, and one destroyer — all spoiling for a fight.

At 8:00 p.m. that evening, the American submarine S-38 was on its station at the southern mouth of the passage between New Britain and New Ireland about 15 miles west of Cape St. George. The submarine’s captain, Lieutenant Commander Henry G. Munson, peered into the periscope at 10:00 p.m. and saw Mikawa’s force moving southward. He wanted to get into position to fire his torpedoes at such tempting targets but could not because the turbulence from the ships’ wakes. However, he did send a sighting report to his base in Brisbane, Australia. Despite Mikawa not wanting his ships seen by American aircraft, submarines, or Australian coastwatchers, this was the second American sighting of his ships.

Mikawa ordered his fleet due east to a point north of Bougainville. His ships turned southeastward far enough from land so that coastwatchers could not sight his ships. Nevertheless, a Royal Australian Air Force Hudson bomber sighted his fleet on August 8 at 11:01 a.m., radioed the sighting report to MacArthur’s headquarters 18 minutes later, and confirmed the earlier B-17s sighting.

Mikawa now realized the Americans detected his ships’ journey but relentlessly continued on his mission. Moreover, this proved to be good decision. The sighting reports reached the American commanders at Guadalcanal but were confusing and misleading.

The Battle is Joined

Mikawa sent one of the cruiser Aoba’s float planes at 6:00 p.m. to Guadalcanal to see what awaited his ships. Six hours later, the plane reported seeing one battleship, four cruisers, and seven destroyers steaming north of Guadalcanal. It also reported there were 2 cruisers, 12 destroyers, and 3 transports near Tulagi. The American transports still were there — unloading supplies in great quantities and sending them ashore — despite exaggerated claims by Japanese bomber pilots.

Mikawa had come too far to turn back now. Six minutes before 1:00 a.m. on August 9, his ships arrived northwest of the channel between

Guadalcanal and Savo Islands. The body of water between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands would soon earn its name – Iron Bottom Sound.

Caught Off Guard

Turner prudently ordered sea patrols in the passage between Guadalcanal and Savo Islands and positioned his heavy cruisers to stop any Japanese incursion from the northwest. Bowing to political expediency with America’s British Allies, the American Navy gave the command of this force of warships to Rear Admiral Victor A. C. Crutchley of the British Royal Navy. In the meantime, Fletcher, true to his promise made at Fiji, began preparations to withdraw his carriers out of range of Japanese ships and planes.

Crutchley established his patrols into three groups divided by a northwest-southeast line running southeast of Savo Island and a line running north and south between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands. The first group, comprised of the Australian heavy cruiser Australia (Crutchley’s flagship), the American heavy cruisers Canberra and Chicago, and the destroyers Patterson and Bagley, steamed west of the dividing line. The second group had the American cruisers Vincennes, Astoria, and Quincy, and the destroyers Helm and Wilson that steamed in a rectangular pattern east of the dividing line. The third group had the cruisers San Juan and Hobart along with the destroyers Monssen and Buchanan and steamed east of the north-south line. The destroyers Blue and Ralph Talbot steamed back and forth as pickets guarding the passages between Guadalcanal and Savo and Savo and Florida to the northwest to provide an early warning if any Japanese ships

Meanwhile, Turner called a meeting of his senior commanders aboard the McCawley. Crutchley, obviously part of that group, agreed to attend. For some unknown reason, he took his flagship Australia with him to where the McCawley was instead of using his admiral’s barge or one of the destroyers. He thus reduced his cruisers’ firepower by one-third.

The Battle of Savo Island

Mikawa’s ships arrived later and totally surprised the Americans. The American reliance betrayed them when his ships passed undetected until one of the Patterson’s lookouts spotted the Japanese force and sent a message of understatement:

“WARNING — STRANGE SHIPS ENTERING HARBOR!”

The battle was on. What followed was one of the worst defeats in the history of the United States Navy. Using their superior nighttime surface battle tactics, optical sighting systems, and Long Lance torpedoes, the Japanese sank the four cruisers Canberra, Astoria, Quincy, and Vincennes, while heavily damaging the Chicago. Japanese aircraft sank the destroyer Jarvis later well after the battle ended. Admiral Turner concisely stated afterward the reasons for the devastating Japanese victory:

“. . . The Navy was still obsessed with a strong feeling of technical and mental superiority over the enemy. In spite of ample evidence as to enemy capabilities, most of our officers and men despised the enemy and felt themselves sure victors in all encounters under any circumstances.

. . . The net result of all this was a fatal lethargy of mind which induced a confidence without readiness, and a routine acceptance of outworn peacetime standards of conduct. I believe that this psychological factor as a cause of our defeat was even more important than the element of surprise.”

However, author Richard B. Frank offers more optimism when he assessed the Battle of Savo Island in his book, Guadalcanal:

“This lethargy of mind would not be completely shaken off without some more hard blows to Navy pride around Guadalcanal, but after Savo the United States Navy picked itself up off the deck and prepared for the most savage combat in its history.”

Nonetheless, the word “Savo” seared itself into the memories of all the American sailors who fought the battles for Guadalcanal.