Go to Home page
Click on one of the icons below to purchase my book.

Go to Amazon.com
AbeBooks
Alibris Books
Buy from Barnes & Noble
MobipocketLogo
createSpace-logo
Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands

 

Pursuing the Holy Grail

On May 27-28, 1905, Adm. Heihachiro Togo defeated the Russian Baltic Sea Fleet in the Tsushima Straits (Eastern channel of the Korea Straits between Japan and Korea). This dramatic naval victory made Japan an equal military partner with the Western Powers. The Imperial Japanese Navy’s prime directive became to meet their enemy in one climactic battle and achieve victory for their nation in one swift blow. During the struggles for Guadalcanal, that strategic goal had not changed.

Adm. Yamamoto was aboard his flagship, the great battleship Yamato, in Truk Lagoon in late October 1942 pondering how to achieve victory for Japan and end the war with Americans before they became so strong that they could no longer be defeated. His previous attempts at this seemingly unreachable objective had failed. His attack at Pearl Harbor had not destroyed the American carriers as he had planned. When he tried to lure the American carriers into a trap at Midway, Nimitz foiled the grand plan by having returning the favor by having the American carriers waiting when the Japanese fleet appeared off Midway.

This time Yamamoto still commanded a powerful fleet — two fleet carriers, two light carriers, four battleships, eight heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, 30 destroyers, and 12 submarines — or a total of 61 ships. Meanwhile, Halsey had a smaller fleet to counter Yamamoto’s next move — two fleet carriers, one battleship, 2 heavy cruisers, four light cruisers, 14 destroyers — or a total of just 23 ships.

Ships at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands

 

CV

CVL

BB

CA

CL

DD

Subs

Total

Americans

2

0

1

2

4

14

0

23

Japanese

2

2

4

8

3

30

12

61

On paper, the Japanese had an overwhelming advantage in ships. The number of carrier aircraft each side had still tipped the scale toward the Japanese — Japanese: 211; Americans — 171. However, the Americans had a decided advantage in land-based aircraft — 271 versus 220 for the Japanese. These aircraft would play a significant role in the battle to come.

Aircraft at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands

 

Carrier-based

Land-based

Total

Americans

171

271

442

Japanese

211

220

431

An excellent opportunity emerged for the Japanese Navy to overcome the latest debacles suffered by the Army. Adm. Ugaki, Yamamoto’s chief of staff, looked upon the future with a sense that if they could defeat the American fleet, Japan could at last bring the Americans to the negotiation table and end this terrible war.

Japanese Preparations

A Japanese search plane found an American carrier and 15 other ships about 140 miles northeast of Ndeni Island. Another report arrived stating there were three battleships, one cruiser, and ten destroyers 30 miles west of the Rennell Islands on a 150° course. The American ships were well within the range of Japanese land-based aircraft. The optimism of officers of the Combined Fleet climbed to the level that existed just before Pearl Harbor. The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands was about to begin. However, the Americans had plans of their own.

American Movements

After Halsey took command, he met with Vandegrift and Turner and said that the U.S. Navy had to do more to help the beleaguered Marines on Guadalcanal. While Henderson Field (CACTUS) still operated as the main defensive weapon against the Tokyo Express, its existence had become increasingly tenuous from naval bombardment and air attacks. If the Japanese destroyed or severely disabled the airfield, the American hold on Guadalcanal would disintegrate.

Meanwhile, the carrier Enterprise became operational again after Pearl Harbor finished refitting her. The battleship Washington returned to the Pacific Fleet from the Atlantic after assisting the Royal Navy in the Mediterranean Sea and Indian Ocean. With the carrier Hornet and the battleship South Dakota (Task Force 17) now near Guadalcanal, Halsey now had enough naval power to challenge any Japanese naval movements in the Solomons. He ordered Radm. Kinkaid to take Task Force 16 with the Enterprise to join Radm. Murray’s Task Force 17 steaming near Nouméa. When he arrived, Kinkaid would assume overall command under a combined designation of Task Force 61. Meanwhile, he ordered Radm. Willis Lee’s Task Force 64 with the battleship Washington to return to Espiritu Santo after a Japanese submarine torpedoed the heavy cruiser Chester. Lee refueled and sailed for Guadalcanal on October 23 with the mission to stop any Japanese surface ships from bombarding Henderson Field.

Halsey’s plan took his naval force from his predecessor’s defensive posture to the offensive. It was a daring plan that sent Task Force 61 north of the Santa Cruz Islands and search for the Japanese carriers. Kinkaid and Murray rendezvoused to lay in wait, just like at Midway, for the Japanese carriers.

In the meantime, American cryptographers analyzed Japanese naval radio traffic and learned of a Japanese codeword called “Y-day.” They could not find out when “Y-day” would occur and what would happen on that day. Other traffic analysis pointed to at least eight Japanese submarines near Guadalcanal. The latest intelligence estimate said that now ten Japanese submarines were nearby, and a major Japanese offensive was two or three days away. Another intelligence report indicated that the Japanese fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku were at Truk but did not know where the light carrier Zuiho was. It also reported the other two light carriers Junyo and Hiyo were in Japanese home waters. Actually, the Junyo and Zuiho were with the fleet carriers at Truk.

On October 23, American search planes provided more definite information. One of them spotted one carrier that morning 650 miles north of Espiritu Santo. Later that evening, another search plane reported seeing on heavy cruiser, one light cruiser, and two destroyers steaming ahead of one carrier. The American now definitely knew that at least one Japanese carrier was nearby.

Both sides began to launch aircraft to find each other. The Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands  — the fourth carrier battle of World War II — was about to begin.

Keeping Score

The Americans sustained a terrible tactical defeat at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands with the loss of the Hornet. This ship was the carrier that carried Jimmy Doolittle’s B-25 bombers on their famous surprise raid on the Japan home islands. She also played an important role at Midway when her planes helped sink four Japanese fleet carriers. Meanwhile, American carrier aircrews heavily damaged the Japanese fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku. Their damage was so severe that Yamamoto had to send both ships back to Japan for repairs.

However, the most telling losses become apparent when comparing the losses of American and Japanese aircrews. The following table illustrates both sides’ losses.

Air Crew Losses at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands

 

American

Japanese

Pilots

18

68

Observers/Air crew

8

77

Totals

26

145

Section leaders and above

5

23

The Japanese suffered far worse aircrew and pilot losses than did the Americans. These are even more serious when one looks at the losses in the leadership positions. While the Americans had an active pilot and aircrew training program that continued to send replacements to battle, the Japanese never established as extensive training program. They prepared for a quick victory that now had become even more elusive. This trend would continue as the war continued and would affect the naval air battles to come in the Pacific war.

Top of page 

Copyright Kenneth I. Friedman © 2007-2010 - All rights reserved