A Command Crisis

Despite the repeated setbacks the Japanese Army suffered at the hands of the Americans, some of the senior officers still desperately wanted a victory on Guadalcanal. The commander-in-chief of the 8^th Army Group, which included the 17^th Army, Gen. Hiroshi Imamura, had enjoyed success in Southeast Asia in the early Pacific War.

He thought he could instill a badly needed vitality into the 17^th Army with a positive approach. He developed a plan to land two more divisions on Guadalcanal on February 1, 1943 and take the fight to the Americans again. Imamura issued an energetically decisive order to his command:

“We must by the most furious, swift, and positive action deal the enemy annihilating blows to foil his plans completely. . . It is necessary to arouse the officers and men to a fighting rage.”

It is clear that if Gen. Imamura had read some of the diary entries being written by his men on Guadalcanal, his order might have had a different tone:

Dec. 18: “Rice long since eaten up, even coconuts running short.

Dec. 23: “Haven’t seen one of our planes for ages, but every day enemy planes dance in the sky, fly low, strafe, bomb, and numerous officers and men fall, . . .“

Dec. 26: “We are about to welcome the New Year with no provisions; the sick are moaning within the dismal tents, and men are dying daily. We are in a completely miserable situation. . . Why should we be subdued by these blue-eyed Americans? I intend to get onto the enemy airfield and let two or three of them have a taste of my sword. . . O friendly planes! I beg that you come over soon and cheer us up!”

The plight of the Japanese soldier had reached a crisis. Vigorous debates raged among the highest levels in Tokyo. They even reached the Emperor himself. His annual year-end message for 1942 had a far more somber tone than the one he issued in 1941:

“The Emperor is troubled by the great difficulties of the present war situation. The darkness is very deep but dawn is about to break in the Eastern Sky. Today the finest of the Japanese Army, Navy, and Air units are gathering. Sooner or later they will head toward the Solomon Islands where a decisive battle is being fought between Japan and America.”

The debates continued and turned toward whether the Japanese should continue the attempts to remove the Americans or give up and evacuated all their men from the island. As the repeated supply missions continued to fail, the pressure on the Japanese High Command increased to do something.

The Army continued their planning to land more troops. Meanwhile, the arguments crystallized to two facets of the Japanese efforts in the South Pacific.

1. Put all operations on Guadalcanal on hold, begin evacuating their men near the end of January 1943, and get all their men off the island by the beginning of February. As the men left Guadalcanal, the Japanese would occupy all the Solomon Islands north of New Georgia and Ysabel islands.
2. Reinforce their men on New Guinea to hold the strategic points at Lae, Salamaua, Madang, and Wewak. Capture key points north of the Owen Stanley Mountains to prepare to attack Port Moresby.

The Japanese had made a critical decision to retreat. However, they managed to keep their plans from the prying ears of the American intelligence gatherers. This was their first order to give up ground to the Americans. It certainly would not be their last.

The Americans Begin a Ground Offensive

Halsey decided as early as November 3 that the Marines needed to be relieved. Parts of the U.S. Army’s 43^rd Division had already arrived as early as October. Halsey made his case for more troops for Guadalcanal. Admirals King and Nimitz intensely lobbied the JCS and finally got an agreement on November 30 to send the Army’s 25^th Division that had languished on the Hawaiian Islands to Guadalcanal. Vandegrift received a clear and definitive message that his relief was on its way, “1st MarDiv is to be relieved without delay. . .and will proceed to Australia for rehabilitation and employment.”

The Army was now to take on the dominant role on the island. Halsey agreed an Army general should command all American ground troops. Gen. Millard Harmon, Halsey’s commander of all Army units in his SOPAC command, chose Ma j. Gen. Alexander Patch, the current of the Americal Division, to replace Vandegrift. Patch relieved Vandegrift on December 9. Now that the Army was in charge of ground operations on Guadalcanal, it also assumed all supply responsibilities as well.

More American Troops Arrive

As Vandegrift’s 1^st Marine Division began leaving Guadalcanal, Halsey welcomed the 25^th Division’s commander, Maj. Gen. Lawton Collins, to Nouméa. After vigorously shaking Collins’ hand, Halsey told the general his division would leave for Guadalcanal on the next day. Meanwhile, the 2^nd Marine Division had already arrived on the island. Units of 25^th Division began coming ashore December 17 with more of its men streaming ashore from that time until January 4. Patch now commanded three divisions and formed them into the XIV Corps. As of January 7, 1942, American ground forces numbered more than 50,000 men.

American XIV Corps on Guadalcanal — January 7, 1942

Division Total Officers Enlisted Men Americal 16,196 837 15,339 25th 12,629 605 12,024 2nd Marine 14,733 657 14,676 Total 50,078 2,402 47,676

Growing American Air Power

The 1^st Marine Air Wing (MAW) had accomplished much with extremely limited resources. It had achieved air superiority and repeatedly helped prevent or severely limited the ability of the Tokyo Express to land supplies on Guadalcanal. However, they had reached their limit and near total exhaustion and badly needed relief. Halsey responded by ordering the 2^nd MAW to relieve the 1^st. The 2^nd arrived on December 26.

By December 1942, the Marines and Seabees had built two additional airfields called Fighter One and Fighter Two. These fields could handle the increasing number of American naval, Army, and New Zealand fighters that now poured onto Guadalcanal. The Seabees also finished a larger airstrip near Koli Point large enough to handle heavy bombers and named it Carney Field. A new radar installation went into operation around the same time.

The Americans meant to make Guadalcanal a major base of operations to capture the rest of the Solomons and were well on their way to completing that task. Once they defeated and evicted the Japanese from the island, they could begin their conquest of the Solomons.

A Series of Ground Operations

In December, the Americans used their ground forces to begin a series of ground operations that began dislodging the Japanese. From that time until February 1943, the Americans and Japanese troops fought tough struggles that proved the American soldier and Marine more than the equal of the Japanese soldier. The Americans relentlessly dislodged the Japanese troops at places such as Mount Austen, Gifu, Hill 27, Galloping Horse, Sea Horse, and Kokumbona. The exhausted Japanese had no choice but to continue to retreat northwestward as the Americans pursued them toward Cape Esperance. The ground offensive lasted until February 7, 1942 when the Japanese Navy successfully evacuated what was left of their worn out men from Guadalcanal. They could claim a pyrrhic victory since the Americans never found out their plan to pull their Army off the island. When American soldiers walked into the village of Visale near Cape Esperance, they could help but be surprised to see no Japanese soldiers alive left. On February 8, 1943, the Americans claimed Guadalcanal as their own.

The six-month fight over who would capture Guadalcanal ended as an overwhelming Allied victory. From this time forward, the Japanese went on the defensive and tried to hold onto what they had. But the American industrial power would prove to be more than the Japanese could handle. They would continue to give up territory for the next two-plus year.

Copyright Kenneth I. Friedman © 2007-2008 - All rights reserved