Battle of the Eastern Solomons

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Reacting to Defeat

After Mikawa returned victoriously from Savo Island, the Japanese Army, which held the American soldier in contempt, sent a 900-man detachment commanded by Colonel Kiyoano Ichiki to Guadalcanal. Filled with confidence, Ichiki met the American Marines in combat and got the surprise the Imperial Japanese Army had not anticipated. The conflict between Ichiki’s men and the American Marines at the Battle of Tenaru River resulted in the detachment’s slaughter with just 20 survivors.

The news of Ichiki’s defeat shocked Japanese senior commanders including Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. He reacted to the bad news by organizing a new operation called Operation “KA.” The mission’s primary objective was the reinforcement of the Japanese troop on Guadalcanal with 1,500 men. Rear Admiral Tanaka would command a fleet of one light cruiser, eight destroyers, and three transports carrying the 1,500 soldiers. Almost the entire Combined Fleet would steam to somewhere east of the Solomons and take on the American carriers the Japanese navy knew were there.

The Japanese naval force was the most powerful to sail since Midway. The ships at Truk were:

Japanese Naval Forces—Battle of the Eastern Solomons
Force Designation	Commander	Ships
Carrier Strike Force	Nagumo	Fleet carriers: Shokaku, Zuikaku Destroyers: Kazegumo, Yugumo, Makigumo, Akigumo, Hatsukaze, Akizuki
Vanguard Force	Abe	Battleships: Hiei, Kirishima Heavy cruisers: Kumano, Suzuya, Chikuma Light cruiser: Nagara
Advanced Force	Kondo	Heavy cruisers: Atago, Maya, Takao, Myoko, Haguro Light Cruiser: Yura Destroyers: Kuroshio, Oyashio, Minegumo, Hayashio, Natsugumo, Asagumo
Detached Carrier Strike Force	Hara	Light carrier: Ryujo Heavy Cruiser: Tone
Main Body (at Truk)	Yamamoto	Battleship: Yamato Escort Carrier: Taiyo Destroyers: Akebono, Ushio
Convoy Escort Force	Tanaka	Light Cruiser: Jintsu Destroyers: Kagero, Mutsuki, Yayoi, Isokaze, Kawakaze, Suzukaze, Umikaze, Uzuki

After defeating the American carriers, Tanaka could land the soldiers on Guadalcanal with almost nothing to stop him. However, the Americans had other ideas.

American Intelligence Reports and Plans

Commander Edwin Layton, CINCPAC’s intelligence officer, released an August 6, 1942 intelligence estimate that stated the Imperial Japanese Navy’s carriers were in Japanese home waters. He also warned they could sortie at any time. Another intelligence report stated there was a high likelihood the Japanese carriers were still in Japan. Nonetheless, the men at CINCPAC seemed confused about the whereabouts of the Kido Butai. Admiral Ghormley absorbed all this garbled mess and sent Fletcher a message to expect a Japanese attempt to attack Henderson Field on August 23-26.

Fletcher commanded Task force 61 that included three carrier task groups. Fletcher commanded Task Force 11, Rear Admiral Thomas Kinkaid Task Force 16, and Rear Admiral Leigh Noyes commanded Task Force 18.

Task Force 61—Battle of the Eastern Solomons
Task Force	Commander	Ships
11	Fletcher	Carrier: Saratoga Heavy cruisers: Minneapolis, New Orleans Destroyers: Phelps, Farragut, Worden, MacDonough, Dale
16	Kinkaid	Carrier: Enterprise Battleship: North Carolina Heavy cruiser: Portland Light cruiser: Atlanta Destroyers: Balch, Benham, Maury, Ellet, Grayson, Monssen
18	Noyes	Carrier: Wasp Heavy cruisers: San Francisco, Salt Lake City Light cruiser: San Juan Destroyers: Farenholt, Aaron Ward, Buchanan, Lang, Stack, Sterett, Selfridge

Fletcher led his three-carrier task force from the vicinity of San Cristobal Island on August 22 and set a course toward a position south of Guadalcanal. He wanted to refuel his ships — now an obsession with him — and deployed his fleet to rendezvous with nearby American tankers. While his ships took on fuel, an American PBY sighted Tanaka’s ships moving southwest about 300 miles northwest of Guadalcanal.

Fletcher wanted to move toward Guadalcanal to attack the approaching Japanese ships. However, he still had not decided whether to send Noyes’ Task Force 18 south to refuel. He sent his planes to Henderson Field because he did not want to lose fighter strength he believed needed for CAP. There were no reports of any Japanese carriers nearby since his latest intelligence reported these warships were in Japanese home waters. Therefore, he ordered Noyes’ ships to head southward to refuel. The Wasp’s 26 fighters, 26 dive-bombers, and 11 torpedo bombers steamed southward. The rest of Task Force 61 reversed its course and headed north. Fletcher’s aircraft strength was now about one-third weaker.

On August 24, CINCPAC reported that the Japanese fleet carriers Zuikaku and Shokaku were not in Japanese home waters but at Truk. That disclosure would have a direct effect in the carrier battle to come.

Girding for Battle

Both sides’ forces were on their way to engage their opponents in battle. Tanaka and his transports steamed down the Slot. Kondo and the Kido Butai steamed toward a position where they believed the American carriers were. Fletcher’s Task Force 61 meandered around the eastern side of Malaita Island. The Japanese wanted to surprise the Americans. Nonetheless, this was not the way events transpired.

Tanaka’s force had to turned around and head north then turn around and head south several times because of reports of the presence of American carriers. When finally turned southward, American PBY bombers spotted his ships, continued to follow his course, and continuously sent reports to Cactus. Tanaka knew that more planes had landed on Guadalcanal. He now realized the Americans were ready for him.

Meanwhile, Kondo, filled with confidence with two of Japan’s powerful aircraft carriers under his command, steamed to a place about 250 miles east of Guadalcanal. He sent some planes to bomb Henderson Field. The appearance of Japanese carrier aircraft confirmed that Japanese carriers were within aircraft range. Fletcher could now get ready to attack them.

What followed was essentially two battles. The first was the attempt to land reinforcements and supplies for the Japanese soldiers. The second was the third major carrier battle in World War II in the waters east of the Solomon Islands. The Japanese attempts to reinforce and resupply their soldiers on Guadalcanal was now the centerpiece of Japanese tactics in the southern Solomons. The only way Americans would relinquish their stranglehold on Guadalcanal was for the Japanese Army to defeat the American marines and soldiers firmly entrenched there. The Battle of the Eastern Solomons was just the beginning of a series of vitally important and deadly sea and air battles that decided which side would be the permanent occupiers of Guadalcanal.