The Tokyo Express Runs Again

Four Japanese officers arrived at Truk aboard a giant Kawanishi Flying Boat to see the now legendary leader in the Japanese pantheon of heroes, Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. Two of these men were two Imperial Japanese Navy officers, Capt. Yasuji Watanabe, the Combined Fleet’s planning officer, and Cmdr. Toshikazu Ohmae, from the 11^th Air Fleet’s staff. Representing the Imperial Japanese Army were two officers, Col. Masanobu Tsuji, chief of the Operations section, Army General staff, and Maj. Tadahiko Hayashi of the 17^th Army. A boat met the plane after it landed in Truk’s lagoon and took them ashore to meet with the admiral.

The purpose of these officers’ visit was to convince Yamamoto to agree to another resupply and reinforcement mission to Guadalcanal. The previous Japanese attempts to use its ground forces to kick the Americans off Guadalcanal had failed. Japanese intelligence continued to underestimate the strength of American ground forces. To overcome these past mistakes, the Japanese Army decided to send a full division to Guadalcanal.

However, sending a force of this size required a naval commitment the Japanese Navy had previously never tried. Both service branches would have to coordinate their efforts at a greater level than in other joint operations. Yamamoto’s approval was an essential requirement for this plan to succeed. Col. Tsuji presented the plan to the admiral. His presentation describing the Japanese soldiers’ plight as desperate moved the admiral. Yamamoto agreed to the plan driven by his feelings to give as much help to their men on the island.

Tsuji returned to Rabaul and told a now jubilant Lt. Gen. Harukichi Hyakutake, the commander of the 17^th Army, of Yamamoto’s approval. The general personally would lead the operation with the major force coming from Lt. Gen. Masao Maruyama’s 2^nd Division.

The navy formed a formidable force of ships commanded by Radm. Takaji Joshima that included two light carriers, the Chitose and Nisshin, and six destroyers. That group would bring the troops to Guadalcanal. Another group of ships commanded by Radm. Aritomo Goto assembled with the mission to shell Henderson Field. It had the three heavy cruisers, Aoba, Kinugasa, and Furutaka, and two destroyers. The plan was for this group of ships to arrive after the Army landed its ships and destroy Henderson Field so that the Americans lost control of the air.

The ships carrying the troops left Rabaul on October 3, 1942. Goto’s ships left eight days later.

The Americans Have a Plan of their Own

The 1^st Marine Division also needed reinforcements and supplies. Ghormley sent the Army’s 146^th Regiment. But the Marines still needed more men and supplies. Meanwhile, he collected powerful naval forces to make sure the reinforcements and materiel got ashore safely and intact. The first two forces included the carrier Hornet, commanded by Radm. George D. Murray, and the battleship Washington, commanded by Radm. Willis A. Lee. The third force, commanded by Radm. Norman Scott, had two heavy cruisers, the San Francisco, Scott’s flagship, and Salt Lake City, two light cruisers, the Helena and Boise, and five destroyers. The Americans moved these ships nearer to Guadalcanal to protect their ships carrying more troops to Guadalcanal.

Early Movements

While the Hornet and Washington task forces stayed south of Guadalcanal, Scott’s force cruisers and destroyers stayed out of range from Japanese aircraft based at Rabaul. But, on October 11, an American B-17 bomber spotted the wakes of Japanese ships heading down the Slot at a speed of 25 knots about 260 miles northwest of Guadalcanal. The B-17’s crew reported the sighting to Henderson Field. Scott’s force also heard the sighting report.

Meanwhile, the radar at Henderson Field detected a flight of unidentified planes heading on a southeasterly course at a distance of 138 miles from Guadalcanal. The coastwatchers did not detect the planes. But any planes coming in that direction could only be Japanese. The 1^st Marine Air Wing scrambled their planes and launched 52 planes to intercept approaching Japanese planes. After a series of American air attacks on the Japanese airplanes, the Japanese planes withdrew with minor losses. The first Japanese attack on Henderson Field failed to close the vital American airfield.

The Americans meet Goto’s Threat

Another American plane also sighted Japanese ships thus confirming the earlier sighting. The report stated:

“6 DDs 2 cruisers bearing 305 distance 210 from Guadalcanal course 120”

These ships were the ones carrying the Japanese reinforcements and supplies. The Americans had yet to find Goto’s force. Maj. Gen. Roy S. Geiger, the commander of all air forces on Guadalcanal, knew American warships were on their way and did not want to use his valuable planes to attack the approaching ships when the American warships could more than deal with the approaching Japanese ships. When night came, the oncoming Japanese ships were about 110 miles from Guadalcanal.

After receiving the sighting report of the Japanese ships approaching ships, Scott increased his force’s speed to 29 knots to reach Guadalcanal before midnight. His ships went to battle stations. By 8:30 a.m., Scott’s ships were off Cape Hunter, an point of land where Guadalcanal’s southern coastline turns northwesterly. He changed course to the northwest and headed toward West Cape, the islands westernmost point. He steamed to Cape Esperance and entered the area where he thought the Japanese would attempt landing their troops. Scott had ordered his search planes to fly over the waters between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands. No moon now shown; the night was pitch-black.

Scott turned his force northward and changed his course to starboard at 10:25 p.m. toward Savo Island as his ships passed Cape Esperance. He knew the Japanese were not far away and wanted to prepare to meet them in battle. Wanting to cross the Japanese ships’ “T”, he ordered his ships into the classic line of battle formation of a single file. The American ships stretched out for three miles with the destroyer Farenholt leading the way and the McCalla bringing up the rear. With three destroyers in front and two trailing them, the four cruisers, led by the flagship San Francisco, in the formation’s middle.

The current American naval doctrine called for the destroyers to lead other warships in battle. But this formation prevented Scott from using this tactic since all his ships were in a single line that had to maintain its formation unless otherwise ordered. Nonetheless, the tactical situation was about to change drastically.

Twenty minutes later, the Farenholt’s lookouts saw a shape moving on a parallel course and six miles from Guadalcanal’s northern coastline. The dark background of the island made identification of the shape harder than usual. The Japanese ships could be out there. Blue lights flashed in the distance. The Farenholt failed to report the sighting to the flagship. Meanwhile, Scott nervously paced on the San Francisco’s bridge. The mystery of the shape’s identity vanished when an American search plane’s pilot reported seeing:

“One large, two small vessels, one six miles from Savo off northern beach Guadalcanal. Will investigate closer.”

He had found the Japanese ships carrying their troops and supplies.

The search plane’s report puzzled Scott and his staff. Were the ships Japanese? Even if they were, there was another Japanese force on its way. Scott maintained his course steaming between Savo and Guadalcanal Islands. Soon, his ships were too far to the north to be able to stop any Japanese ships coming down the Slot. He ordered a 180° course change at 11:33 p.m. that caused severe problems later in the battle to come. As soon has his ships began turning around, his formation soon became confused and in disarray.

Admiral Goto Draws Near

Goto’s force left Shortland Island’s anchorage on October 11 at 2:00 p.m. and headed southeast down the Slot. Its planned arrival was two hours after the ships carrying the troops and supplies arrived off Guadalcanal. The trip went smoothly except for some heavy squalls accompanied by drenching rain. The bad weather would hide the ships’ approach from American search aircraft and the prying eyes of the coastwatchers.

When Scott began his turnabout maneuver, Goto moved at high speed down the Slot. While the Americans spotted ships carrying the troops, the Japanese had not seen any sign of American ships. Goto had no idea there was American opposition. None of his ships had any radar on them. As his ships neared its intended target area, Goto ordered his ships into a bombardment formation. He was a confident man who expected to deliver the highly sought after knockout blow to the American airfield. The Battle of Cape Esperance was about to begin.

Copyright Kenneth I. Friedman © 2007-2011 - All rights reserved