A Tale of Two Leaders

Two opposing commanders would face each other for one of the most decisive ground battles in the conflict on Guadalcanal. The Japanese commander, Major General Kiyotake Kawaguchi, was the commander of the 17^th Army’s 35^th Brigade. This unit had tough combat experience capturing Singapore, taking the Philippines, and fighting the Australians and Americans on New Guinea. Kawaguchi had the look of the old-time Samurai warriors one pictures when thinking of Japan’s warrior-dominated past. A tough, no nonsense leader, he commanded the respect of his men and his adversaries. This 48-year-old officer’s new assignment was to land his brigade under the auspices of the Imperial Japanese Navy with the assistance of Rear Admiral Raizo Tanaka. After the slaughter of Ichiki’s detachment, the Japanese ground war on Guadalcanal was at a standstill. The Imperial Japanese Army hoped Kawaguchi would the man to break the stalemate and get the Japanese ground operation moving again.

Marine Lieutenant Colonel Merritt Austin Edson was an American officer who was a respected leader of men. Standing just five feet, seven inches tall, he was a reserved, quiet-spoken, and mild mannered man that belied the fire inside him. A superb expert in small unit infantry tactics, he had pale-blue eyes that showed a steel-like toughness about him that could turn any potentially tough-minded subordinate to jelly. Nevertheless, he commanded the respect one needed to be a successful leader of men in combat. He would need all the courage and leadership qualities he possessed in the pulse-pounding, dramatic ground battle to come.

These two men’s destinies became inexorably entwined in the next severe ground battle over a small coral mound not more than 120 feet high that was just southeast of Henderson Field. If left undefended, any soldiers could come from the south, burst from the dense jungle undergrowth at the airfield’s southern perimeter, and overwhelm the field’s defenders. It was not much of a hill. However, when Edson reviewed its terrain and surroundings, it did not take much thinking for him to realize its strategic importance. The fate of the American hold on Henderson Field was now in his capable hands.

Introducing Edson’s (aka Bloody) Ridge

The tough Kunai grass with its sharp-edged leaves covered the mound Edson had to defend. No other plant life could grow on this ground since it consisted primarily of rocky coral. It stood southeast of Henderson Field with two prominent hills. The promontory nearest to Henderson Field was named Hill 120 — it was about 120 feet high. The second hill was south of Hill 120 and named Hill 100 — about 100 feet high. Dense jungle growth lay to the west, south, and east while a nearly clear path lay to the north.

When Edson examined the hill, it did not take much imagination to see that if the Japanese attacked and overran the ridge, they would have a clear path over nearly level ground to Henderson Field. The Americans would not have the high ground; Henderson Field would undoubtedly fall to the Japanese.

Of course, the hill did not have Edson’s name given to it yet. Of course, that would soon change. The adjective of “bloody” would soon equally apply too.

Getting Ready

The First Marine Division did not have enough men to fully encircle Henderson Field. However, they had the terrain and impenetrable jungle on their side when Vandegrift set his defenses in preparation of the imminent Japanese attack. He had an advantage of knowing Kawaguchi’s plans from captured Japanese documents. Vandegrift fervently hoped the Japanese would attack where he had placed his defenses. As it turned out, he got his wish.

The anchor of the general’s defenses was Edson’s position on the ridge. Protecting the right flank was Lieutenant Colonel Frederick C. Biebush commanding the 3^rd Battalion, 5^th Marine Regiment’s position west of the Lunga River. Lieutenant Colonel Edwin A. Pollock’s 2^nd Battalion and Lieutenant Colonel William N. McKelvy’s 3^rd Battalion, 1^st Marines guarded Vandegrift’s left flank. He ordered Colonel Pedro de Valle, commander of the 11^th Marine Artillery Regiment, to place Lieutenant Colonel E. H. Price’s 5^th Artillery Battalion’s 105-mm howitzers on Henderson Field’s southern edge to provide Edson artillery support. The 1^st Pioneer Battalion and the 1^st Amphibian Battalion protected Edson’s immediate left while the 1^st Engineering Battalion positioned itself to his right rear.

Before long, Martin Clemens’ scout reported seeing Kawaguchi’s men moving through the jungle toward Edson’s position. The Japanese were on their way. Kawaguchi split his attacking force into three salients. The main attack against Edson comprised of a main, three-battalion, northerly salient directly against Edson’s position on the ridge. Meanwhile, one battalion turned northward to attack the Marines’ left or eastern flank near the Ilu River. Another Japanese battalion would attack the Americans’ right or western flank near the coast west of the Lunga River.

Kawaguchi’s plan, like most Japanese battle plans, relied on nearly precise timing. However, the dense Guadalcanal jungle and its rugged terrain would throw his timing into a cocked hat. Even the three-prong main assault could not be synchronized because of Kawaguchi’s inability to factor in the terrain and jungle into his plans. Nevertheless, what followed was one of the most intense, bloody ground battles ever fought in the Pacific war. Both sides would pay dearly in losses in men and materiel. But Edson held his ground and prevented another Japanese attempt to capture Henderson Field. The American land-base aircraft carrier continued to operate and take its toll on the Japanese during the struggle for Guadalcanal.

Copyright Kenneth I. Friedman © 2007-2010 - All rights reserved