It was now November 1942, and that month ushered in a naval battle for the ages. The battle occurred over several days — November 12-15, 1942. This battle had two entirely different struggles. The first would see every aspect of what the Pacific had displayed and would display all the aspects of modern World War II warfare: naval surface battle, air attacks, and attempts to land forces against a hostile foe. The second day was a harbinger to the early days of sail and steam: heavy ships exchanging heavy gunfire.

Reaching a Turning Point

The Imperial Japanese Navy believed it severely had crippled the American Navy at the Battle of the Santa Cruz Islands. When the Hornet sank, the Japanese cheered at the prospect that all American naval aviation was gone. They firmly believed they had sunk two Yorktown-class carriers while the Americans actually lost just one carrier. Nevertheless, the Japanese Army’s failures on Guadalcanal frustrated the naval senior officers. The American air power at CACTUS prevented the army from landing the reinforcements and supplies sorely needed by their men on Guadalcanal.

Despite the Japanese frustration, the fight between the Japanese 17^th Army and the American Marines and soldiers had reached a stalemate. Henderson Field was still in American hands. The Japanese needed a new plan. It soon took form when two Japanese naval staff officers arrived.

Capt. Yasuji Watanabe and Cmdr. Toshikazu Ohmae arrived at Truk on November 8 and reported to the senior officers within one hour. The naval staff had analyzed the ground situation on Guadalcanal and offered their conclusions:

• The island’s terrain made the delivery of materiel to the troops who needed the most exceedingly difficult.
• Despite the losses of ships from American air attacks, the ships had successfully off-loaded and brought ashore about 80% of the supplies the troops needed.
• The army’s leadership lacked skill fighting the Marines, seemed discouraged, and needed a shot in the arm.
• The Americans weakened the Japanese troops’ strength because of incessant air attacks from planes based on their airfield, disease, lack of sufficient food, and lack of effective command.

But the army’s leadership wanted to do more to defeat the Americans and retake the island. Their plan included several good ideas:

• The army would reconsolidate their lines and shorten the distance from the beaches. In that way, it would be easier to deliver any supplies and reinforcements from the ships offshore.
• Some of their troops now imbedded in the jungle would wage a guerrilla campaign until they consumed all their food.
• They would begin an attack on the American western flank at the Matanikau River.
• A new convoy would bring the 38^th Division to Guadalcanal in November with the 51^st Division following one month later. At that time, there would be sufficient strength to launch a major offensive.

The army’s dedication to win on Guadalcanal impressed Yamamoto such that he rededicated his command to do all it could to help them. He put a new plan in place.

Yamamoto’s Plan

The Imperial Japanese Navy still had a strong fleet at Truk despite missing the carriers Zuikaku, Shokaku, and Zuiho. As Yamamoto planned his campaign to help the army, he decided to assemble two forces with groups of ships in each force.

• Advanced Force commanded by Vadm. Nobutake Kondo responsible to protect Mikawa’s Force from attacks by the American carriers
• Raiding Group commanded by Radm. Hiroaki Abe
• Main Body led by Kondo
• Carrier Support commanded by Vadm. Takeo Kurita
• Outer South Seas Force commanded by Vadm. Mikawa responsible for the landing of troop and supplies
• Support Group commanded by Mikawa
• Reinforcement Group led by Radm. Tanaka

The ships included in the following:

Japanese Naval Forces at Truk - November 1942

Ship Group CVL BB CA CL DD Transports Raiding Group 0 2 0 1 12 0 Main Body 0 1 2 1 10 0 Carrier Support 1 2 1 0 4 0 Support Group 0 0 4 2 4 0 Reinforcement Group 0 0 0 0 11 11 Total 1 5 7 4 41 11

The Japanese turned Yamamoto’s plan into action on November 9. Kondo’s Advanced Force left Truk about noon that day. While powerful in its own right, it paled in comparison to previous sorties that Japanese had made earlier in the Guadalcanal campaign since two fleet carriers and one light carrier were in Japan undergoing repairs. His force included the battleships Hiei and Kirishima.

The timetable for the operation covered four days with the day of landing the troops called “Z-day.” Each day had specific actions.

Imperial Japanese Navy’s Mid-November Plan

Day Actions Z-3 Land-based aircraft bomb American airfields Z-2 Battleships and cruisers shell Henderson Field Z-1 Japanese carrier aircraft bomb American airfields Z-0 Japanese troops and supplies land in force on Guadalcanal

The latest Japanese intelligence estimated that an American convoy headed west from Hawaii and another moving east from Auckland. The army’s news from Guadalcanal did little to raise Japanese morale. The men suffered from malnutrition, disease, and exhaustion. Just one-fourth to one-third of the Japanese soldiers could not continue fighting. This operation had to succeed if the Japanese had any chance of retaking Guadalcanal.

The next day, the Japanese detected one American heavy cruiser, several destroyers, and three transports. If Kondo’s force could get to their assigned positions soon enough, they could intercept the American ships and easily destroy them. It was clear to everyone at Combined Fleet headquarters at Truk that a momentous battle was about to happen. Yamamoto set Z-day for November 13, 1942.

Anxiety at Guadalcanal

With the loss of the carrier Hornet, the Americans examined their situation on Guadalcanal and determined that trouble lay ahead. They were about to begin a two-front war when they landed troops in North Africa. This would place more pressure on an already stretched logistics system. However, President Roosevelt expressed his concerns about the Pacific theater in a note to the JCS dated October 24 in which he wrote:

“My anxiety about the Southwest Pacific is to make sure that every possible weapon gets into the area to hold Guadalcanal, and that having held in this crisis, munitions, planes and crews are on the way to take advantage of our success. We will soon find our-selves engaged in two active fronts and we must have adequate air support in both places even tho it means delay in our other commitments, particularly to England. Our long range plans could be set back for months if we fail to throw our full strength in our immediate and impending conflicts.”

The president’s note clearly indicated the commanders in the Pacific had to fix a severely strained logistics system. No man understood the seriousness of the problem more than Halsey. He already knew that Vandegrift’s Marines badly needed reinforcements. After returning from a visit to Guadalcanal on November 10, Halsey read a CINCPAC intelligence report that said a major Japanese offensive would begin soon. They would land troops and position their ships east of Guadalcanal. American intercepts of Japanese naval radio traffic led to a belief the attack would happen either on November 12 or 13.

Before he went to Guadalcanal, Halsey ordered Turner to take 6,000 Marines and soldiers from Espiritu Santo and Nouméa to Guadalcanal. As Halsey visited Vandegrift, Turner’s ships were already at sea to execute the largest landing of American troops since the initial invasion of August 7.

Assembling an American Fleet

Turner’s ships needed protection from Japanese naval and air attacks. Halsey gathered every warship he had to make sure his transports arrived safely and successfully land the troops. Halsey established three task forces commanded by Turner (Task Force 67), Kinkaid (Task Force 16), and Lee (Task Force 64). Turner’s escort would have two task groups of cruisers and destroyers. Each escort group would have each of two admirals leading them — Radm. Norman Scott (Task Force 62.4) and Radm. Daniel Callaghan (Task Force 67.4).

American Warships — Naval Battle of Guadalcanal

Task Force Commander CV BB CA CL DD 16 Kinkaid 1 0 2 0 6 64 Lee 0 2 0 0 2 67.4 Callaghan 0 0 2 3 10 62.4 Scott 0 0 0 1 4 Totals 1 2 4 4 22

Kinkaid took his force south of Guadalcanal. Lee moved south of the island and be ready to move nearer to Guadalcanal if any Japanese battleships should move into a threatening position. Callaghan and Scott steamed to the waters between Guadalcanal and Florida Islands to protect Turner’s transports.

Gathering for Battle

Both sides now moved into places to make war on each other. A monumental naval battle would soon begin and turn the balance of power in the southern Solomons decidedly toward the Americans. But the price of victory would come high.

Copyright Kenneth I. Friedman © 2007-2008 - All rights reserved