Not too much time passed after December 7, 1941 when Admiral Chester W. Nimitz, relieved his predecessor, Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, as Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet (CINCPAC). The fleet’s battleships laid in the mud of Pearl Harbor. The Americans had just the aircraft carriers Enterprise, Yorktown, and Lexington to defend the Hawaiian Islands and American mainland’s west coast against a feared Japanese invasion. 

He immediately went to work rebuilding the fleet. Wanting to maintain continuity, he kept many of Kimmel’s staff and gradually replaced them with men of his own choosing. American submarines immediately began patrols in Japanese waters to sink their merchant shipping – just as the German Navy were doing against the British.

Battle of the Coral Sea

But the Pacific war did not stop. Based on the American successes breaking the Japanese naval code, Nimitz learned of the Japanese preparing an invasion fleet to capture Port Moresby on the southern coast of New Guinea. If they succeeded in that venture, the Australian continent would be placed in great jeopardy.

He sent Rear Admirals Jack Fletcher in the carrier Yorktown and Aubrey Fitch in the carrier Lexington to the Coral Sea – a body of water in the Southwest Pacific Ocean surrounded by Australia in the west, New Guinea to the north, and the Solomon Islands to the east. These ships met a powerful Japanese carrier force that had the fleet carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku and the light carrier Shoho commanded by Vice Admiral Takeo Takagi. The two carrier groups’ aircraft sighted each other’s ships. Nonetheless, neither side’s ships ever sighted each other – a historical first in naval warfare.

The result of the battle was the loss of the Japanese light carrier Shoho and the much more serious of the sinking of American carrier Lexington. In a scenario that soon became a familiar one in the Pacific war, the Japanese won a tactical victory but a strategic loss. The American opposition forced them to cancel their planned invasion of Port Moresby. The Japanese failed to achieve the objective.

Battle of Midway

While the Japanese fought in the Coral Sea, Vice Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto had even greater plans. He wanted to invade the American-held island of Midway and lure the American carriers into an all-out final carrier battle. If he succeeded, the overwhelming Japanese force of their four best fleet carriers: Akagi, Kaga, Soryu, and Hiryu – all veterans of their victory at Pearl Harbor – would meet and defeat the American carriers that tried to come from Hawaii and meet them in battle. After that, the United States would have no choice but to negotiate and end to the war in the Pacific. Japan would at last achieve the long-dreamed-of objective – the Pacific Ocean would become a Japanese lake.

Nevertheless, the American code breakers at Pearl Harbor intercepted Japanese radio messages, analyzed them, and deduced they planned an invasion of an objective the Japanese called “MI.” The Americans could not what and where “MI” was. But using a clever ruse, they sent a message in the clear that said Midway’s water condenser was inoperable. The Japanese took the bait and sent messages stating that “MI’s” water condenser was not working.” The Americans intercepted that transmission and decoded it. “MI” had to be Midway.

Nimitz sent every carrier he had – the Enterprise, Hornet, and Yorktown – out to take a position northeast of Midway and wait for Yamamoto’s fleet. After American PBY patrol aircraft spotted the Japanese fleet on June 4, 1942, airplanes left all three American carriers, surprised the Japanese just as they were about to launch their aircraft, and attacked. After the smoke cleared, the cream of the Japanese carriers lay in smoking ruins. All four Japanese carriers sank.

Guadalcanal – America’s First Offensive

A far greater task lay in front of Nimitz when he received information of the greatest amphibious operation the Americans had ever attempted – the invasion of Guadalcanal. As usual, Nimitz conducted himself in his efficient and direct manner and was directly responsible for the American victory in the South Pacific.

He faced two difficult command decisions during the mighty struggle for Guadalcanal. After the Guadalcanal invasion and the first of the two great carrier battles in the waters near Guadalcanal, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, many officers severely criticized Admiral Fletcher. Nimitz continued to support Fletcher until reports arrived from other senior officers that criticized Fletcher for his overall conservative and timid approach to commanding carrier task forces. Eventually, Fletcher received a new assignment in Washington reporting to Admiral King.

The second difficult problem Nimitz faced was the lack of direction and forceful leadership from Vice Admiral Robert L. Ghormley, the commander of the South Pacific (COMSOPAC) area. After highly respected officers such as General Harold “Hap” Arnold visited the South Pacific and reported his findings to Nimitz and King, Nimitz took immediate steps to replace Ghormley with Vice Admiral William F. Halsey. Halsey’s arrival was like a breath of fresh air. The events in the South Pacific decidedly turned for the better.

Copyright Kenneth I. Friedman © 2007-2011 - All rights reserved